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Review Essay 
Kenneth Starr: Diabolically Evil? 
THE TICKLISH SUBJECT: THE ABSENT CENTRE OF POLITICAL ONTOLOGY. 
By Slavoj Zizek.t London: Verso, 1999. Pp. 416. $27 cloth. 
SIC 2: COGITO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS. 
Slavoj Zizek ed. Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1998. 
Pp. 288. $54.95 cloth. 
THE PLAGUE OF FANTASIES. 
By Slavoj Zizek. London: Verso, 1997. Pp. 288. $65 cloth. 
Reviewed by Jeanne L. Schroedertt and David Gray Carlsonttt 
In the midst of unparalleled peace and prosperity, American politics 
plunged into a traumatic episode when the Republican Party attempted 
to remove President William Jefferson Clinton from office for crimes 
never very clearly spelled out. The main result of this initiative was that 
Republicans (for example, Newt Gingrich and Bob Livingston) were 
forced out of office, while Clinton enjoyed a level of popularity rarely 
matched in American history. 
Why did the public turn on the accusers and not on the accused? It 
cannot be said that the Republicans were hypocrites. Hypocrites insin-
cerely take on the mantle of morality in order to gain from their deceptions 
and dissemblance.1 If the Republicans were hypocrites, they would have 
dropped the matter as soon as it became clear that political disaster was the 
only wage to be gained from the pursuit. Yet they proceeded anyway. The 
dogged march toward political self-destruction is hardly the stuff of hypoc-
risy. 
If not hypocrisy, why then did they march on in pursuit of Clinton? 
And why did impeachment prove unacceptable to the public? Slavoj 
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l. Cf. HENRY E. ALLISON, KANT'S THEORY OF FREEDOM 160 (1990) (hypocrisy is the 
"compliment which vice pays to virtue"); IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 180 
(T.K. Abbott trans., Prometheus Books 1996) (hypocrisy is driven by private advantage but dresses 
itself in morality). As we shall discuss later in this Review Essay, hypocrisy is not to be scorned totally. 
It is, in fact, the price we necessarily must pay for civilization. 
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Zizek's recent books help to explain. Zizek merges the psychoanalytic the-
ory of Jacques Lacan with the European speculative philosophic tradition 
associated with Kant and Hegel. Zizek's work should be of interest to law-
yers and legal philosophers because it explains the link between law and 
evil. 
In the three volumes we review here, Zizek explores the implications 
of Descartes ("I think therefore I am") and, even more especially, Kant (the 
expositor par excellence of evil). These two philosophers are of tremen-
dous importance to modem psychoanalytic theory. Zizek shows them like-
wise to be the quintessential philosophers of impeachment. 
At stake in Zizek's work is the very foundation of subjectivity in law. 
The role of law in the very constitution of subjectivity is much neglected 
in American liberal philosophy. Though certainly obsessed with law as 
a means to control human behavior, American liberal philosophy has 
contented itself with super-simple behaviorist psychology. Typically, 
American jurisprudence assumes that law is "positive," but the subject of 
law is "natural." Law is conventional, but the subject is self-identical-a 
rational entity upon whom law can operate in instrumental ways. Hence, 
the archetypical American project is to redesign law in ways that increase 
human enjoyment-namely, utilitarianism. Utilitarianism treats the human 
subject as an unexamined self-identity that produces preferences as brute 
givens. Alternatively, law is praised or condemned on natural libertarian 
principles that rest on the prelegal self-identicality of personality. 2 
Positivist jurisprudence assures us that there is no necessary connec-
tion between law and morality, 3 but psychoanalysis proves this to be false. 
A cataclysmic coincidence of law and morality, as we shall show ,4 is quite 
necessary to the very emergence of human subjectivity. Consequently, the 
great achievement of modem liberal jurisprudence is not, as the positivists 
assume, the discovery of a preexisting, necessary distinction between law 
and morality. Rather, it is the very act of separation itself, the building of 
the wall to separate law from morality, whose coincidence is sublimely 
monstrous. 5 Man cannot long carry the affliction of uncompromising 
morality. Positive law displaces direct reference to morality. By doing so it 
both masks over and attempts to confine morality's sublime monstrosity. 
Zizek's writing is uncannily enjoyable, considering that English 
is Zizek' s third or fourth language. The tone is colloquial, humorous, 
2. See David Gray Carlson, Liberal Philosophy's Troubled Relation to the Rule of Law, 43 U. 
TORONTO L. J. 257 (1993) (book review). 
3. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 
(1958). 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 78-97. 
5. An object is monstrous, Kant assures us, if, by its size, it destroys the purpose which 
constitutes the concept of it. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 32-33 (J.H. Bernard trans., 
Hafner Press 1951 ). 
2000] DIABOUCAL EVIL 655 
sometimes amazingly blunt, and fast-paced indeed. In a single paragraph, 
Zizek easily skips from Hegel to Kierkegaard to Heidegger to a film by 
David Lynch. 6 Yet one has a sense of a careful unity to the writing. 
Themes at the beginning of any given book are well battened down by the 
time you reach the end. 
In America, Zizek is best known as a film critic, most particularly 
as an expositor of the implicit Lacanian themes in the works of Alfred 
Hitchcock.7 He therefore has become a hero to the burgeoning field of 
"cultural studies." But make no mistake about it. Though he traffics in 
cultural artifacts from the movies and TV, Zizek is this decade's outstand-
ing philosopher of subjectivity. If he visits the movies, it is strictly a field 
trip to acquire grist for the psychoanalytic mill. 
Ideally, the best way to read Zizek might be to read all of him, starting 
with his first book and proceeding through the next nine (he writes 
approximately one book a year) in the order that he wrote them. One would 
then encounter a continuing conversation Zizek conducts with himself 
about the nature of the subject. Indeed, throughout his books, he visits the 
same themes again and again. By the end, these themes are old friends, but 
one definitely feels no sense of sterile repetition here. In revisiting a topic, 
he always sheds new light on it. Hence, every book remains vital and can 
be read independently.8 
In his most recent work, Zizek concerns himself with the problem 
of evil and makes the surprising claim that this concept is precisely the 
Cartesian cogito ergo sum ("I think therefore I am"). 9 Descartes designed 
the cogito to winnow away the contingent, so that what has matter in itself 
lies rich and unmingled in its self-certainty. 10 Thus, it is the "standard 
notion of neutral universality, indifferent to its particular content ... 
neutral thinking substance, common to all humans, indifferent to gender, 
and as such the philosophical foundation" of political equality.11 
Zizek's books do not discuss impeachment as such. The most recent 
was published in early 1999-too late to take up the proper psychoanalytic 
meaning of the impeachment debacle. 12 These books, however, explain the 
6. See, e.g. , id. at 51. 
7. See EVERYTHING You ALWAYS WANTED TO KNow ABOUT LACAN (BUT WERE AFRAID TO 
ASK HITCHCOCK) (Slavoj Zraek ed. , 1992); SLAVOJ ZIZEK, LOOKING AWRY: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
JACQUES LACAN THROUGH POPULAR CULTURE 97-98 (1991) [hereinafter LooKING AWRY]. 
8. This, we hope, excuses us for making our argument about impeachment from various other 
writings besides the three most recent volumes, which are the occasion for this Review Essay. 
9. See RENE DESCARTES, Meditations II: Of the Nature of the Human Mind, in THE METHOD, 
MEDITATIONS AND PHILOSOPHY OF DESCARTES 214,227 (John Veitch trans., 1901). 
10. See SLA VOJ ZIZEK, THE TICKLISH SUBJECT: THE ABSENT CENTRE OF POLITICAL ONTOLOGY 
34 (1999). 
I l. Id . at 100. 
12. Some discussion occurs at the very end of the book. See infra text accompanying note 145. 
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dynamic that drove the impeachment on and on against a public will that 
opposed it. 
Zizek's work suggests that the revulsion the majority expressed 
towards impeachment was related to the Republican claim that they 
obtained no enjoyment from the process. By their own account, the House 
managers were merely doing their grim constitutional duty. They were but 
the ministers and instruments of law and morality. What proved horrific 
was precisely the possibility that Republicans had no free will but were 
automatons of a mad, merciless morality. What the public sensed was a 
whiff of what Kant called diabolical evil. 
Diabolical _evil is evil that comports exactly with the procedural 
requirements of Kantian morality. Diabolical evil is what the perfect coin-
cidence of law and morality portends. When law and morality coincide, the 
ordinary, quotidian traces of evil rooted in the acts of mankind threaten to 
metamorphosize into ·a monstrous, sublime diabolical evil. 
Even worse, we cannot even pretend to abolish diabolical evil. It turns 
out that diabolical evil has a function. Law requires and depends on dia-
bolical evil for its very existence. Diabolical evil, in Kantian terms, is 
indistinguishable from pure morality. We cannot do without morality, so 
we are stuck with diabolical evil. 
Kant's famous categorical imperative-"Act so that the maxim of thy 
will can always at the same time hold good as a particular of universal 
legislation"13-defines morality in formal terms only. The moral act is that 
which is done for the sake of universality alone, out of a duty freely 
adopted on purely rationable grounds. What is done for reasons of particu-
larity-inclination, feeling, or, in general, pathology-is evil.14 Diabolical 
evil, however, is done for nonpathological reasons-out of a duty freely 
adopted on purely rational grounds. Hence, it is indistinguishable from the 
moral. In Kantian philosophy, there is no difference between the highest 
morality and the direst evil. 
Paradoxically, Zizek claims that diabolical evil is also the very 
founding moment of human subjectivity, 15 a claim that we will fully 
explain in due course. 16 According to Zizek, diabolical evil is creative as 
well as destructive. It is the explosive force of the Big Bang that wipes out 
the old in giving birth to the new. It is the universal within us. More 
13. KANT, supra note 1, at 46. Zuek, incidentally, claims that Lacan identifies the Critique of 
Practical Reason, with its analysis of the categorical imperative, as the "birth of psychoanalysis." 
SLAVOJ ZIZEK, FOR THEY KNow NOT WHAT THEY Do: ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL FACTOR 229 
(1991). 
14. Within the Kantian tradition, the term "pathological" carries none of the negative 
connotations of "diseased" or "sick." Rather, based on the Greek root pathos (suffering), pathology 
merely designates that which relates to emotions and feelings-as opposed to pure reason. KANT, supra 
note 1, at 94. 
15. See SLA voJ ZIZEK, THE PLAGUE OF FANTASIES 229 (1997). 
16. See infra text accompanying notes 36-53. 
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precisely, it is the Cartesian moment of cogito ergo sum. In a very para-
doxical sense, then, Republicans were indeed doing their grim constitu-
tional duty, if, by "constitution," we speak of our psychoanalytic 
constitution. As we shall explain, the death drive of the Republican party 
was fully foretold in Descartes' maxim, "I think therefore I am." 
On Zizek's line of reasoning, the American majority is mistaken if 
they think that only the "bad Republicans" are capable of taking joy in rage 
and destruction, untempered by pity or remorse. This blind destruction 
in the name of morality is fundamental to personality-even Democratic 
personality. As Linda Tripp explained, "I'm just like you."17 Let the 
Democrats scorn this remark. Zizek shows that Tripp was dead on the 
money when she said this. In a fundamental way, we are Linda Tripp. We 
share her penchant for utter destruction. And this is why the Republicans 
had to drop so precipitously (if temporarily) in the polls. 
In this Review Essay, we will explore the idea of diabolical evil as the 
obscene supplement of law. We will show why morality is simultaneously 
a necessary component of personality and, in its pure form, indistinguish-
able from Kant's "diabolical evil." Diabolical evil is nothing but the nega-
tive freedom of the human subject, and as such, is the very foundation of 
liberal philosophy and modem psychoanalysis. Without the theoretical 
possibility of thoroughgoing evil, there can be no "good" and no culture. 
Indeed, culture is nothing but the regulation of evil that displaces diabolic 
evil with legality18 and the everyday immorality that Kant called "radical" 
evil.19 We legislate positive law precisely to foreclose the possibility that 
diabolical evil might manifest itself in the empirical world. 20 The 
"ontologization" of diabolical evil bears a precise name in psychoanalytic 
terms-psychosis. Yet, ironically, this psychosis underlies and precedes 
(and is required by) law and concrete freedom. It is the cogito--horrific in 
its universality. 
17. Elaine Sciolino, Testing of a President; Tripp, Her Testimony Over. Says Truth Was Her 
Only Motive, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1988, at Al 7. 
18. "Legality" consists of acts outwardly conforming to law but undertaken for private reasons 
unconnected with respect for law. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 17-18 (Mary 
Gregortrans., 1991). 
19. According to Kant, 'This evil is radical, since it corrupts the ground of all maxims; as natural 
propensity, it is also not to be extirpated through human forces." IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN 
THE BOUNDARIES OF MERE REASON 59 (Allen Wood & George Di Giovanni trans. & eds., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1998). It is a common misperception that the Kantian term "radical" evil bears the 
colloquial connotation of really, really extreme evil (that is, diabolical evil), perhaps because of 
Hannah Arendt's terminology in her famous work on the banality of evil. See HANNAH ARENDT, 
EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (1987). Zaek himself made this 
terminological error in his early work. SLA VOJ Zu:EK, TARR YING WITH THE NEGATIVE: KANT, HEGEL, 
AND THE CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY 45-47, 95 (1993); Jacques-Alain Miller, A Discussion of IAcan's 
"Kant with Sade," in READING SEMINARS I AND II: LACAN'S RETURN TO FREUD 212, 215 (Richard 
Feldstein et al. eds., 1996) ( discussion between Miller and Zizek). 
20. See Zu:EK, supra note 10, at 132. 
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We will suggest that the reason why the majority of the voting public 
reacted negatively to the specter of impeachment is connected to a dim 
recognition that we might be glimpsing sublime diabolical evil. To be sure, 
the position of diabolical evil cannot be sustained-though it can be tragi-
cally destructive for short periods. Kant's terminology makes this clear. 
Just as no man is an angel, 21 no man is a demon capable of such disinter-
ested purity. And so, we will conclude that, despite the public's suspicion, 
the Republicans never achieved diabolical evil, just ·garden variety, human 
"radical evil," like the rest of us. Their specific form of radical evil, the one 
manifest in prosecutorial zeal (wickedness) bears only a surface resem-
blance to diabolical evil. Nevertheless, Kant emphasizes that great 
destructive forces exist in nature are "sublime." They give rise to the illu-
sion that we can attain the noumenal realm of pure morality-and therefore 
diabolical evil.22 The American public has tasted the sublimity and finds it 
prefers sublimation-positive law that stabilizes society and defers for a 
time our place on the slaughterbench of history. 
I 
THE ADVENT OF LACANIAN THEORY 
Few Americans have noticed the deposition of Freud as the high 
priest of psychoanalytic theory. The usurping hand that wrenched the 
scepter from his grip belongs to Jacques Lacan, a French psychoanalyst 
and philosopher whose career spanned from the 1930s until his death in the 
1980s.23 
Zizek' s relation to Lacanian psychoanalysis is rather like that of St. 
Paul to Christianity.24 Zizek usually speaks in Lacan's name, but one has 
the uncanny feeling that Zizek is filling in the harmonies, as Busoni did for 
Bach, in ways that would have surprised (and presumably pleased) the 
original author. 25 
Lacan' s great innovation was, in fact, a recapitulation. He famously 
insisted in his first ten seminars26 that psychoanalysis needed to "return to 
21. See KANT, supra note 1, at 155. 
22. See KANT, supra note 5, at 96-101. 
23. For some introductions to Lacan from a lawyer's perspective, see JEANNE LORRAINE 
SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES: HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY, AND THE FEMININE (1998); 
Jeanne L. Schroeder, The End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis of Law and Economics, 112 HARV. L. 
REv. 483 (1998). 
24. Incidentally, Zizek finds in St. Paul a precursor to Kant as expounder of radical evil. See 
ZIZEK, supra note 10, at 126-55. 
25. Zizek is a product of the "Slovenian school"-a remarkably original group centered in the 
University of Ljubljana whose works are collected, inter alia, in Sic 2: COGITO AND THE 
UNCONSCIOUS (Slavoj Zizek ed., 1998) [hereinafter Sic 2]. This book of essays is one of the works 
being reviewed here. For a history of the Slovenian school, see Ernesto Laclau, Preface, in SLAVOJ 
ZlzEK, THE SUBLIME OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY (1989) [hereinafter SUBLIME OBJECT]. 
26. Lacan typically did not write books or treatises but gave "seminars," which consist of 
transcripts-no doubt heavily edited after the fact. 
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Freud."27 But he did not mean by this that we should slavishly crouch at the 
feet of Freud as prophet. Rather, Lacan sought to tum psychoanalytic tech-
nique on itself by examining its origins in Freud's seminal writings. Most 
notably, Lacan recovered the repressed intellectual context in which psy-
choanalytic theory gestated-the European speculative philosophical tra-
dition.28 By subjecting Freud to the Hegelian dialectic and, figuratively, 
putting Kant, Hegel, et al. on the couch, Lacan was able to add the insights 
of philosophy to psychoanalysis and to develop a richer theory of the sub-
ject than his predecessor. Zizek, in tum, has brought the interplay of psy-
choanalysis and philosophy to a new level. Consequently, even though 
Lacan, a clinician, developed his discourse as a means of analyzing 
patients, his theory, as expanded by Zizek, speaks to any discipline-
including jurisprudence-that depends on a theory of the relation of the 
subject and the law. 
Zizek' s overriding concern is the subjective experience of law-but 
not law as H.L.A. Hart might conceive it. Hart would define law as a sub-
set of culture produced by intuition (that is, a "rule of recognition"). 29 In 
effect, Hart thought that law was whatever the law schools customarily 
teach. For Zizek, law means the entire symbolic order-knowledge, under-
stood as the complete chain of signification which Lacan designated by the 
"matheme" "Sz". 30 S2 is the set of all ideas, all concepts, all distinctions that 
have ever and will ever be drawn. In general, the psychoanalytic law stands 
for "being." In Cartesian terms, if we think and therefore we are, law is on 
the side of the "are." 
To be sure, in Zizek's work, law includes the political constitution and 
criminal law-laws that Hart would "recognize." These are exemplars 
within S2, and Zizek frequently addresses them; but law includes superego 
prohibition as well. Zizek locates the ground of the superego in S2, which 
generates the very idea of subjectivity. S2 internalized becomes the super-
ego. Yet law is never fully internalized. It is "ex-timate"-a foreign 
intruder into our most intimate core.31 Human subjectivity is therefore both 
created by, yet fundamentally alienated from, law. 32 
27. E.g. , Bruce Fink, Preface to READING SEMINARS I AND II: LACAN'S RETURN TO FREUD, 
supra note 19, at l. 
28. Indeed, as far as we can tell, Freud never read a word of Kant or Hegel, except for what, if 
anything, might have been required reading at his gymnasium or university. See DANIEL BERTHOLD-
BoND, HEGEL'S THEORY OF MADNESS 100 (1995) (stating that Freud cited Hegel only once, in a way 
that indicated unfamiliarity with Hegel's work). 
29. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94-95 (1961). 
30. In comparison, S1 is the Master Signifier-a void that must be "filled in" with an exemplar 
from the portfolio of Si- See ZIZEK, supra note 13, at 23-25. A "matheme"-Lacan' s neologism-is a 
pseudo-mathematical expression. 
31. "Ex-timate" is a Lacanian neologism, representing that which is foreign but within us. See 
ZIZEK, supra note 10, at 45. The "ex-timate" is what we are "more than ourselves." Id. at 375. It 
reflects the proposition that what we feel is most ourselves-our subjectivity, our sexuality, our desire, 
our moral conscience, et cetera-is created through intersubjective relationships, language, and law 
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In mainstream jurisprudence, law is outside human desire. Its purpose 
is seen as, variously, to fulfill, control, or thwart preexisting "natural" 
desires. In contrast, law operates at the level of desire in Lacanian theory. 
Lacan belongs to a tradition, going back at least to Aristotle, that denies the 
subject is natural. Rather, the subject is the product of law and cannot 
coherently be considered separate and apart from it. In this tradition, there 
is no prelegal self. Indeed, in Lacan, law constitutes desire. 
Furthermore, unlike utility-based systems of discourse which domi-
nate American law talk, the Lacanian tradition emphasizes the transcen-
dental element of freedom that each subject enjoys. In truth, American 
liberal philosophy thinks that it honors the freedom of the natural subject to 
follow her ends where they might lead (consistent with the rule of law), but 
its concept of freedom is precritical, abstract, and unsatisfactory. The free-
dom of American liberal philosophy is merely a "negative freedom"-the 
freedom to do what you want, no matter how arbitrary and capricious 
(always with the proviso that you must not violate the rights of others). 
Negative freedom, however, ends up being all form and no content. When 
negative freedom obtains a content, it is supplied by our inclination--0ur 
pathological side, the side of feeling.33 In the end, mere negative freedom 
is, in fact, slavery to impulse (as law-and-economics emphasizes, when it 
enchains the subject to "incentives"). Of negative freedom Hegel wrote: 
It is inherent in arbitrariness that the content is not determined 
as mine by the nature of my will, but by contingency; thus I am 
also dependent on this content, and this is the contradiction which 
underlies arbitrariness. The common man thinks that he is free 
(that is, the symbolic order) and is, therefore, in some way outside of ourselves as well. See Schroeder, 
supra note 23, at 502-03. See generally Jacques-Alain Miller,&timiti (Fran~ise Massardier-Kenney 
trans.), in LACANIAN THEORY OF DISCOURSE: SUBJECT, STRUCTURE AND SOCIETY 74 (March Bracher 
et al. eds., 1994). 
32. This state of alienation is what Lacan called castration. In Lacanian terms, castration is ''the 
understanding that we only exist as subjects within law and language, yet law and language are external 
to, and imposed on, our subjectivity." SCHROEDER, supra note 23, at 67. Castration refers to ''the 
subject's alienation by and in the Other and separation from the Other." BRUCE FINK, THE LACANIAN 
SUBJECT: BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND JOUISSANCE 72 (1995). In other words, we ''find" ourselves only 
in external materials outside of ourselves. As Zilek puts it: 
by means of the Word, the subject finally finds himself, comes to himself: he is no longer a 
mere obscure longing for himself since, in the Word, he directly attains himself, posits 
himself as such. The price, however, is the irretrievable wss of the subject's self-identity: the 
verbal sign that stands for the subject-in which the subject posits himself as self-identical-
bears the mark of an irreducible dissonance; it never 'fits' the subject. This paradoxical 
necessity on account of which the act of returning-to-oneself, of finding oneself, 
immediately, in its very actualization, assumes the form of its opposite, of the radical loss of 
one's self-identity, displays the structure of what Lacan calls 'symbolic castration'. This 
castration involved in the passage to the Word can also be formulated as the redoubling, the 
splitting, of an element into itself and its place in the structure. 
SLAVOJ ZizEK, THE INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER: AN EssAY ON SCHELLING AND RELATED MATTERS 46-
47 (1996). 
33. See generally David Gray Carlson, Duel/ism in Modem American Jurisprudence, 99 COLUM. 
L. REv. 1908 (1999). 
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when he is allowed to act arbitrarily, but this very arbitrariness 
implies that he is not free.34 
661 
What negative freedom implies is that the human subject is permitted to 
follow his irrational impulse. Visions of the good (in deontological theo-
ries) and mere preferences (in utilitarian theories) are usually accepted as 
brute givens. Liberal philosophy takes note of these givens only when they 
intrude upon the rights of others. Otherwise, it is not interested. 
In the tradition of Kant, Hegel, and Lacan, the slave to passion is not 
free. Kantian freedom is not natural but transcendental. Thus, Hegel 
emphasizes that the negative freedom that grounds the ordinary science of 
American political philosophy 
so misapprehends itself as to place its essence in [abstract freedom, 
or pure ego], and flatters itself that in thus being with itself it 
possesses itself in its purity. More specifically, this self-subsistence 
is the error of regarding as negative that which is its own essence, 
and of adopting a negative attitude towards it. Thus it is the 
negative attitude towards itself which, in seeking to possess its own 
being destroys it, and this its act is only the manifestation of the 
futility of this act. 35 
In short, American political philosophy denies that there even is an uncon-
scious-which is, of course, the bread and butter of psychoanalysis, in 
more ways than one. 
This is not to say that psychoanalysis celebrates the unconscious. 
Zifok strongly claims that the unconscious is precisely the cogito of mad 
impulse. 36 What Zizek promises, through Lacan, is precisely freedom from 
irrational impulse-freedom from the unconscious and a truer rationality 
than that which American jurisprudence tends to sponsor. 
II 
THE COGITO AS 0RIGINARY 
It has become fashionable among critical theorists to dismiss 
Descartes as "modern. "37 Having been blamed for everything from the 
French Revolution to Communism, from ecological devastation to the 
oppression of women, the cogito is deeply unpopular today, especially with 
the Foucauldians who largely dominate the "cultural studies" trade. 38 
34. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 'f 15, at 49 (Allen w. Wood ed. & 
H.B. Nisbet trans., 1993). 
35. GEORG W.F. HEGEL, SCIENCE OF LOGIC 172 (A.V. Miller trans., 1969). 
36. See ZU:EK, supra note 10, at 62-65, 149, 247-48, 365-67. 
37. Typically, "Cartesianism" is associated with a denial of the unconscious. See BERTHOLD-
BoND, supra note 28, at 99. 
38. Even Vice President Gore has found it politic to take potshots at Descartes. See ALBERT 
GoRE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: EcOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT (1992). 
662 CALIFORNIA IA W REVIEW [Vol. 88:653 
Zizek, however, maintains that, by identifying mankind's essence as 
pure intellect that is only contingently housed in a body (that is, as the 
ghost in the machine), Descartes paved the way towards conceptualizing 
the abstract autonomous individual of classical liberal philosophy. Hence, 
in gratitude, Zizek announces that he intends to "save" Descartes from 
postmodern criticism. 39 
But it does not take long before we see that Zizek intends a defense 
that Descartes himself would not appreciate. Descartes wrote, "I think 
therefore I am." The Lacanians, however, emphasized that Descartes was 
disastrously wrong if he hazarded this proposition as a statement of simple 
identity ("I think = I am").40 If we focus solely on the result ("I am") of the 
process ("I think"), the "I" has symbolic reality. It is a concept. It "is." 
But this I that "is" is radically incommensurate with the I that "thinks." 
This thinking I is "not." Hence, what Descartes should have written is, 
"I think, therefore I am not,"41 or "I am not where I think,"42 or "I do 
not think, therefore I am," or "either I think or I am,"43 or "I think, 
therefore ... everything can be reduced to a determined historical totality 
except the hyperbolical project."44 
Zizek makes clear that the cogito ends up being absolute psychotic 
madness. It is "excessive,"45 mad,46 and destructive. Everything in the 
world is enveloped in its wrath. Nothing is left standing before the cogito. 
Zizek much favors the following passage from Hegel's early writing as 
aptly describing the cogito: 
The human being is this night, this empty nothing, that 
contains everything in its simplicity-an unending wealth of many 
representations, images, of which none belongs to him--or which 
are not present. This night, the interior of nature, that exists here-
pure self-in phantasmagorical representations, is night all around 
it, in which here shoots a bloody head-there another white ghastly 
apparition, suddenly here before it, and just so disappears. One 
39. See ZIZEK, supra note 10, at 1-2; see also SLA VOJ ZIZEK, THE ABYSS OF FREEDOM 67 (1997) 
("[N]otwithstanding all the talk about the end of the Cartesian paradigm, we will continue to dwell 
within these conceptual coordinates" ). 
40. Zizek writes: "Descartes' error was precisely to confuse experiential reality with logical 
construction qua the real-impossible." ZIZEK, supra note 19, at 14. 
41. Jeanne L . Schroeder, Three's a Crowd: A Feminist Critique of Calabresi and Melamed's 
One View of the Cathedral, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 396 (1999). 
42. Mladen Dolar, The Cogito as the Subject of the Unconscious , in Sic 2, supra note 25, at 11 , 
28. 
43. Id. at 18; JACQUES LACAN, THE FOUR FuNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 211 
(Jacques-Alain Miller ed. & Alan Sheridan trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1977). 
44. Jacques Derrida, Cogito and the History of Madness, in WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 31 , 57 
(Alan Bass trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1978). 
45. ZIZEK, supra note 10, at 2, 62. 
46. Id. at 62. 
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catches sight of this night when one looks human beings in the 
eye-into a night that becomes awful. 47 
663 
This Hegelian "night of the world" is madness proper-the surrender of all 
symbolic content and the slippage of the human being into pure negati v-
ity .48 
That the cogito is madness is apparent on even casual reflection. If 
everything contingent is removed from your life, and you are unable to 
grasp anything concrete, then you have lost touch with reality, and are, as 
Polonius put it, "nothing else but mad."49 
The cogito is designed to be the one universal thing that underwrites 
our self-certainty, and yet it is madness as such. The madness of the cogito 
is not merely on display in the clinically insane-those with no 
"connection" with contingent reality. You and I and everyone are impli-
cated in the cogito. Occasionally, the cogito "ontologizes" itself (that is, 
manifests itself in empirical reality). When it does, the spectacle is indeed 
sublime. 
In Lacanian theory, although it is madness, the cogito is the first, nec-
essary moment in the creation of the subject-both as a theoretical as well 
as a biographical matter. Self-consciousness originates at the moment 
one becomes aware that one is not something or somebody else. "I am 
not that" (the cogito) is the step that precedes "I am me" (symbolic identi-
fication). One tends to think of madness as a state into which conscious 
human beings slip from a preexisting social reality.50 But Zizek, following 
Hegel,5' insists that madness is a state from which human beings emerge 
to construct a social reality. Thus, Hegel's "night of the world" is 
"pre-ontological";52 it clears the way for the construction of fantasies. 
Empirically this is experienced as a violent moment of separation that, 
after the fact, is reinterpreted as a loss of a mythical preexistent, primal 
wholeness or unity with the universe identified with the maternal body.53 In 
47. Id. at 29-30 (quoting G .W .F. Hegel, Jenaer Realphilosophie, in FRiiHE POLITISCHE SYSTEME 
204 (1974)). 
48. See ZIZEK, supra note IO, at 51 ("[W]hen the phantasmic frame disintegrates, the subject 
undergoes a 'loss of reality' and starts to perceive reality as an ' unreal' nightmarish universe with no 
firm ontological foundation .... "). 
49. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 2, SC. 2. 
50. Berthold-Bond thus remarks that madness is "pure nostalgia." BERTHOLD-BOND, supra note 
28, at 82; see also id. at 83 (finding that Hegel's notion of nostalgic desire "clearly anticipates Freud's 
postulation of a primitive death instinct"). 
51. See GEORG W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND§ 408 Z at 128 (William Wallace & A.V. 
Miller trans. , 1971); ZIZEK, supra note IO, at 36; Slavoj Zizek, The Canesian Subject versus the 
Canesian Theater, in Sic 2, supra note 25, at 246, 257. 
52. ZIZEK, supra note 10, at 33, 42, 63, 65; see also BERTHOLD-BOND, supra note 28, at 29 
(stating that madness is "prior to all human socialization"); WILLIAM DESMOND, BEYOND HEGEL AND 
DIALECTIC: SPECULATION, CULT, AND COMEDY 219 (1992) ("[T]he sleeping innocent unity of 
immediacy must necessarily be ruptured . . .. "). 
53. This loss is "castration," as described supra in note 32. 
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the cogito, one first becomes a person by separating and distinguishing 
one's subjectivity from everything else in the universe. In effect, one oblit-
erates all traces of the world. In Zizek's words: 
In a way, the entire psychoanalytic experience focuses on the traces 
of the traumatic passage from this 'night of the world' into our 
'daily' universe of logos. The tension between the narrative form 
and the 'death drive', as the withdrawal-into-self constitutive of the 
subject, is thus the missing link that has to be presupposed if we are 
to account for the passage from 'natural' to ' symbolic' 
surroundings. 54 
m 
THE MASCULINE AND FEMININE SIDES OF THE COGITO 
Zizek emphasizes that the usual interpretation of Descartes's intended 
meaning ("I think = I am") is the one thing that cannot be true. The tradi-
tional formulation ("I think therefore I am"), however, captures, perhaps 
unintentionally, the Lacanian reinterpretation of the cogito: Thinking 
(action) presupposes and hence creates being (existence), and being pre-
supposes and creates thinking. These, however, can never exist simultane-
ously. 55 This is, in effect, the Lacanian version of the Heisenberg 
uncertainty principle, which posits that although position (existence) and 
momentum (action) both exist at the quantum level, they can never exist 
simultaneously. 56 
Lacan called this impasse "sexual difference."57 The cogito's pole of 
"I am" is the feminine position and the pole of "I think" is the masculine 
position.58 Lacan, however, rejects any relation of simple complementary 
duality .59 The feminine and the masculine are not opposites, but two sides 
of the same coin, the one constantly flipping over into the other. Needless 
to say, the masculine and feminine positions are not to be associated with 
biological males and females. Rather, any given subject always takes both 
54. ZIZEK, supra note 10, at 35. We explain the Lacanian understanding of the death drive infra 
in text accompanying notes 61-65. 
55. The inability of thinking and being to coincide is discussed in David Gray Carlson, The 
Traumatic Dimension in Law (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
56. See FINK, supra note 32, at 133-34. 
57. Desire, in Lacan, cannot be reduced to the animal mating urge in man, nor can sexuality be 
reduced to anatomical difference. Rather, sexuality is the symbolization of sexual difference as two 
different ways the subject can approach the universal experience of being split or "castrated." Although 
most individuals tend to favor the sexual position associated with their biological sex, this is not 
necessarily the case, and everybody adopts both sexual positions from time to time. See ScHROEDER, 
supra note 23, at 56-60. 
58. See ZlzEK, supra note 19, at 59-61; Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Midas Touch: The Lethal 
Effect of Wealth Maximization, 1999 Wis. L. REv. (forthcoming). 
59. See ZlzEK, supra note 19, at 61-62; Schroeder, supra note 58. 
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.the masculine and feminine sides and is constituted with these two centers, 
just as the cogito is doubly centered around thinking and being. 
Nor should these be confused with the traditional identification of 
feminine passivity and masculine activity. On the contrary, the feminine is 
the active position, and the masculine is the passive. 60 The masculine sub-
ject seeks the passive position of being; however, the more he contem-
plates his existence, the further he is from experiencing pure being. 
Constantly in the position of interpreting his existence, he becomes "the 
thing thinking" (the "I think" of the cogito). The masculine subject can 
never approach his own existence, but only impotently circle around it as 
he thinks about his thinking about his existence. This aspect of the cogito is 
the mad disengagement from nature-the death drive. 61 
In Lacan's rewriting of Freud, the death drive has nothing to do with 
the "desire" to die. In fact, Zizek intimates that the death drive is the 
immortal part of our soul-its universality.62 The death drive as compul-
sion is the very inability to die. This is connected to the "pre-ontological" 
nature of diabolical evil. 63 The death drive represents the obscene enjoy-
ment or "jouissance"64 one achieves through compulsive activity-such as 
the overzealous enforcement of law-to its utter destructive limit, no mat-
ter what the consequences. It is the "satisfaction in aberration, and even in 
aberrant acts directed against yourself, that is, finding satisfaction in 
aggression for the sake of aggression."65 
In contrast, the feminine subject wishes to engage in action and so has 
no time for navel gazing. Her motto is "Just do it!" In action, she is so 
totally engrossed that she achieves immediacy. In other words, she loses 
60. Zilek recognizes as much when he labels Kant's dynamic antinomies as feminine and the 
mathematical (that is, passive) antinomies as masculine. See ZlzEK, supra note 10, at 41. 
61. See SIGMUND FREUD, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in 18 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE 
COMPLETE PsYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD (James Strachey ed. & trans .• 1955). On the 
death drive, see ZliEK, supra note 15, at 237-381; ZlzEK, supra note 10, at 41, 52; 'z2EK, SUBLIME 
OBJECT, supra note 25, at 5. 
62. See ZlzEK, supra note 10, at 292-94. 
63. Lacan sometimes also called the drive "libido" or the mythical lamella. See RENATA SALECL, 
(PER)VERSIONS OF LovE AND HATE 48 (1999). Distancing himself from Freud, Lacan did not equate 
drive either with the animal mating instinct nor with human sexuality which is characterized by desire. 
Rather, drive is a uniquely human, nonsexual impulse; it may be thought of as what is left over of the 
primordial "real" animal instinct after its sexual aspect has been symbolized as desire. See id. at 48. In 
Lacan's words "My lamella [Lacan's mythic personification of the drive] represents here the part of a 
living being that is lost when that being is produced through the straits of sex." Jacques Lacan, Position 
of the Unconscious, in READING SEMINAR XI: LACAN'S FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF 
PsYCHOANALYSIS 259,274 (Richard Feldstein et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter READING SEMINAR XI]. 
64. Jouissance is a complex technical term in psychoanalysis. Although in colloquial French it 
means enjoyment and can refer to both sexual orgasm and the enjoyment of property, Lacan's use of 
the term cannot be limited to conventional notions of enjoyment and must not be confused with 
"pleasure," which also has a technical meaning. So-called "feminine" jouissance results from the 
temporary breaking down of the split that separates the three orders of the symbolic, imaginary, and the 
real. In his works, Zilek emphasizes the horrible and terrifying aspect of jouissance as pleasure in pain. 
65. Miller, supra note 19, at 220. 
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conscious awareness and enjoys (that is, does not think about) what she 
does. She becomes pure, immediate, uninterpreted existence, the "I am" of 
the cogito. The feminine insistence on pure existence negates the existence 
of everything else. Consequently, the feminine is the acephalous, 66 active 
moment of destruction which the cogito unleashes-the murderous rage 
that can be generated by the death drive. 
This fundamental paradox illustrates the meaning of perhaps Lacan's 
most famous maxim, "there are no sexual relations."67 Sexuality is an 
essential and impossible nonrelation. 68 Like the two poles of the cogito, the 
two sexual positions require and presuppose each other but cannot coexist 
in the same place. 69 
To recapitulate, the I that thinks is "not." The I that is does not think. 
Here is the key to Zizek's critique of the cogito. Zizek has in mind some-
thing that is very, very negative. The cogito is so negative that all that 
is positive has been removed from it. In many of his works, Zizek empha-
sizes Kant's view that human subjectivity is not even a "noumenon"-a 
66. See ZizEK, supra note 10, at 297. 
67. This slogan paraphrases JACQUES LACAN, 20 THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN: ON 
FEMININE SEXUALITY, THE LIMITS OF LOVE AND KNOWLEDGE-ENCORE 1972-73, 9 (Jacques-Alain 
Miller ed. & Bruce Fink trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1998). See Ellie Ragland-Sullivan, The Sexual 
Masquerade: A Lacanian Theory of Sexual Difference, in LACAN AND THE SUBJECT OF LANGUAGE 49, 
67 (Ellie Ragland-Sullivan & Mark Bracher eds., 1991); see also ELIZABETH GROSZ, JACQUES 
LACAN: A FEMINIST INTRODUCTION 137 (1990). 
68. Monicagate has led to an unfortunate new cliche among Lacanians (one of us has heard it in 
no less than three academic talks by Lacanian psychoanalysts, including one given by Zizek himself). 
President Clinton has been reviled for his ungallant denials of his affair, "I did not have sexual relations 
with that woman-Ms. Lewinsky." To a Lacanian, however, this was not a lie, but a statement of a 
universal truth. No man has ever had, nor ever will have, a sexual relation with a woman. 
69. As Zizek says, the "war between the sexes" does not arise because "men are from Mars, and 
women are from Venus," as new age romantics would have it. If we did come from different planets we 
would be able to accommodate our differences. The problem is that both men and women are from 
Earth. ZIZEK, supra note 10, at 272. 
'There is no sexual relationship' not because the other sex is too far away, totally strange to 
me, but because it is too close to me, the foreign intruder at the very heart of my (impossible) 
identity. Consequently, each of the two sexes functions as the inherent obstacle on account of 
which the other sex is never 'fully itself . .. . 
Id. at 272-73 (emphasis in original). Man and woman are not complements that together may form a 
unified whole. Rather, each is a different failed attempt to be a whole. As explained by Renata Salee!: 
Lacan thus moves as far as possible from the notion of sexual difference as the relationship of 
two opposite poles which complement each other, together forming the whole of 'Man.' 
'Masculine' and 'feminine' are not the two species of the genus Man but rather the two 
modes of the subject's failure to achieve the full identity of Man. 'Man' and 'Woman' 
together do not form a whole, since each of them is already in itself a failed whole. 
RENATA SALECL, THE SPOILS OF FREEDOM: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM AFTER THE FALL OF 
SOCIALISM 116 (1994) (emphasis in original). Consequently, the sexes can never fit together like a 
jigsaw puzzle; they overlap at some places, and leave gaps in others. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, The 
Eumenides: The Foundation of Law in the Repression of the Feminine (1999) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with authors). Although this sounds depressing, there is good news as well. The 
failure of sexual relations creates desire and desire creates the possibility of something more valuable 
than sexual relations-love. 
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transcendental thing in itself.70 The masculine subject as the thing thinking 
can never approach the feminine state of pure existence. And the feminine 
as pure existence threatens to destroy everything in her path, including the 
masculine subject. Even a thing in itself, which we can never experience, 
has far too positive a content to encompass the cogito. 71 If this self were 
noumenal, then God (a noumenon) would be our equal. God would stand 
before our eyes as directly perceivable. We would lose our freedom, if we 
could directly know God's law. We would be mere puppets in the thrall of 
the moral law. Ironically, morality would become legality, and morality 
would be thoroughly pathological-that is, natural.72 
The cogito is what Zizek quotes Kant as calling the transcendental 
imagination.73 It is the pure, uncaused thing. 74 The subject in its radical 
freedom is spontaneous, as Kant always insisted.75 Indeed, freedom is 
defined as the suspension of causality.76 Precisely because they are 
uncaused, human subjects are "ends" and never means to an end. As an 
end, the subject is not "caused" but "causes," and therein lies the 
moralflegal concept of responsibility. Consequently, each subject is a 
"master signifier" (designated by the matheme "Si") that begins and gives 
meaning to the chain of signification (S2) that is the symbolic order of law. 
If we isolate the subject as an "end," we have the cogito. As an "end," 
the subject is radically negative. As radical negativity, the cogito is 
the ideal liberal subject who enjoys "negative freedom" from all outside 
70. See ZIZEK, supra note 10, at 25, 45, 52, 303; see also ZIZEK, supra note 15, at 220; Zizek, 
supra note 51, at 262. 
71. See ZIZEK, supra note 10, at 25 ("[T]his in-between (the subject) [is) neither phenomenal nor 
noumenal, but the gap which separates the two .. . . "). The import of this claim is that the split that 
Kant locates at the phenomenal level is more properly located as within the noumenal level itself. See 
SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE METASTASES OF ENJOYMENT: Six EsSAYS ON WOMAN AND CAUSALITY 51 n.7, 
185-86 (1994); see also ZIZEK, supra note 19, at 35, 45 (Hegel' s innovation over Kant was to insist on 
"a crack in the universal substance"). 
72. See ZIZEK, supra note 10, at 28, 59, 163; see also Miran Bozovic, Malebranche's 
Occasionalism, or, Philosophy in the Garden of Eden, in Sic 2, supra note 25, at 149 (stating that 
perfect knowledge of God's law describes the position of Adam in the Garden of Eden). Likewise, if 
the self could be phenomenally known, this knowledge would imply that the subject is a noumenal 
thing in itself driving the phenomenon, and we would be back at the same dilemma. Hence, the subject 
must be considered neither phenomenon nor noumenon but the purest negativity of Pure Nothing. See 
ZIZEK, supra note 19, at 16. 
73. See ZIZEK, supra note 10, at 23, 30, 39-40, 43, 46, 50, 59. We could not find, however, any 
exact usage of the phrase in the current English translations of the three Critiques. According to Zifok, 
"transcendental" designates objectivity, subjectively mediated. See ZIZEK, supra note 15, at 121. 
74. See ZIZEK, supra note 10, at 257. 
75. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 77-78, 237, 300 (J.M.D. Meiklejohn 
trans., 1990); see also ZIZEK, supra note I 9, at 38 (stating that spontaneity can only occur within the 
horizon of human finitude ). 
76. See ZIZEK, supra note 10, at 43; see also Zizek, supra note 51 , at 261 ("The Kantian notion 
of 'spontaneity' means precisely that I, the subject, am not directly determined by . . . causes: causes 
motivate me only insofar as I reflexively accept them as motifs .. . . "). 
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compulsion. Nothing causes the cogito to behave itself. And nothing is the 
only thing of which we are certain.77 
The cogito is originary, but it also has an ongoing necessity. The 
function of the cogito's negativity is to clear the field of received wisdom 
so that new syntheses can occur. Thus, the transcendental imagination 
deconstructs. It is "counter-factual." Its privilege is to take nothing as 
fixed. The cogito is simply deconstruction taken to its radical extreme-
negativity when no positive content is left. 
IV 
DEATH DRIVE AND LA w 
The cogito represents the explosive appearance of self-consciousness. 
It is "originary" because this madness intervenes between animal existence 
and culture.78 As the death drive, the cogito is "the withdrawal-into-self 
constitutive of the subject [and] is thus the missing link that has to be 
presupposed if we are to account for the passage from 'natural' to 
'symbolic' surroundings."79 Only after the person has achieved self-
consciousness through negative abstraction can he, as a thinking being, 
return and attempt to integrate himself into the world. Of course, perfect 
integration is now impossible since self-consciousness cannot rid itself 
entirely of the cogito.80 Consequently, we can only interpret the world as if 
it were so, in fantasies generated in the orders of the symbolic and the 
imaginary. Although this reintegration is never completely successful, the 
alternative of remaining completely abstracted within the cogito is to have 
no relation to the world and no interrelation with any other subject-
madness itself. Nevertheless, madness is paradoxically the first step-
literally a baby step81-towards sanity. 
77. On this paradox, see Robert Pfaller, Negation and Its Reliabilities: An Empty Subject for 
Ideology?, in Sic 2, supra note 25, at 225. 
78. See Zu:EK, supra note I 0, at 36; Zilek, supra note 51, at 257. 
79. Zu:EK, supra note 10, at 35. 
80. Why not? This is related to the standard Hegelian notion of Aufhebung, a Gennan word that 
simultaneously means ''to destroy" and "to preserve." HEGEL, supra note 35, at 107. The phrase is 
usually translated as "sublation." It is a key term for psychoanalysis, which emphasizes that what is 
repressed (that is, destroyed) always returns in the unconscious (that is, is preserved). See BERTHOLD-
BoND, supra note 28, at 38. Hence, the subject seeks symbolic identification in the symbolic order, and 
in doing so negates the cogito, but the cogito is preserved-as the unconscious. 
81. The madness of the cogito is reflected in the mirror stage of infancy during which the baby 
eventually achieves awareness that his care-giver (and then the rest of the world) is not literally an 
extension of himself. In recognition of the historical norm, this is sometimes expressed in terms of a 
realization that Mother is Other. This is a point missed by American "different voice" feminists such as 
Robin West who argue that only boys develop their personality through differentiation from the 
mother, while girls develop through identification with the mother. Lacanians agree that sexuation is a 
matter of identifying either with or against the maternal, but, from a Lacanian perspective, such 
comparative differentiation can only occur at a later step in development (the oedipal stage). Before 
one can make a comparison and decide whether one is like or unlike something else, one must first 
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How, then, is this acephalous, mad death drive connected to law? 
Zizek insists strongly that law logically requires this death drive. "Logic" 
implies that the relation is not based on inclination or choice. Inclination is 
the realm of contingency. Rather, law requires the death drive as a matter 
of absolute necessity. 
The argument is not expressly set forth in The Ticklish Subject, or his 
other works, but here is how we piece it together from Zifek's various 
writings:82 Law (that is, the symbolic order) and the subject are mutually 
constituting. That is, although the subject is created by law, law requires 
the subject for its own existence. Consequently, each is the condition of the 
other. Law and the subject of law must come into being at the same time. 
Law is thus the origin of personality .83 Law requires the existence of free 
human subjects or it cannot appear. To put this in Hegelian terminology, 
law posits the subject as its presupposition. 84 Without its opposition to the 
subject, law could never appear. This makes the subject an "outlaw." As 
"not-law," the subject is crime. 85 This is why Zizek writes: "[T]he very 
existence of subjectivity involves the 'false', 'abstract' choice of Evil, 
of Crime-that is, an excessive 'unilateral' gesture which throws the 
harmonious Order of the Whole out of balance."86 
recognize that the other person is precisely that-something, or someone, else. Toe judgment, "I am 
like/dislike her" presupposes the realization that I am not her. See SCHROEDER, supra note 23, at 70-73 
82. Zilek's clearest statement of this relation is Slavoj Zilek, Why Does the Law Need an 
Obscene Supplement?, in LAW AND THE POSTMODERN MIND: EsSAYS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS AND 
JURISPRUDENCE 75, (Peter Goodrich & David Gray Carlson eds., 1998). 
83. This argument follows Kant's notion of "origin": 
Origin ... is the descent of an effect from its first cause, i.e., from that cause which is not in 
tum the effect of another cause of the same kind. It can be considered as either origin 
according to reason, or origin according to time. In the first meaning, only the effect's being 
is considered; in the second, its occurrence, and hence, as an event, it is referred to its cause 
in time. If an effect is referred to a cause which is however bound to it according to the laws 
of freedom, as is the case with moral evil, then the determination of the power of choice to 
the production of this effect is thought as bound to its determining ground not in time but 
merely in the representation of reason; it cannot be derived from some preceding state or 
other, as must always occur ... whenever the evil action is referred to its natural cause as 
event in the world. 
KANT, supra note 19, at 53-55. 
84. See HEGEL, supra note 35, at 401-02. 
85. For Hegel, crime constitutes a negatively infinite judgment (for example, "the rose is not an 
elephant"). See HEGEL, supra note 34, at 'f 95. As Hegel puts it in the Lesser Logic: 
Crime may be quoted as an objective instance of the negatively infinite judgement. Toe 
person committing a crime ... does not ... merely deny the particular right of another 
person .... He denies the right of that person in general, and therefore he is not merely 
forced to restore what he has stolen, but is punished in addition, because he has violated law 
as law .... The civil-law suit on the contrary is an instance of the negative judgement pure 
and simple where merely the particular law is violated, while law in general is so far 
acknowledged. Such a dispute is precisely paralleled by a negative judgement, like, 'This 
flower is not red': by which we merely deny the particular colour of the flower, but not its 
colour in general .... 
HEGEL'S Lomc § 173 (William Wallace trans., 3d ed. 1975). Law in turn is precisely opposition to 
crime. See ZliEK, supra note 13, at 34. 
86. Z1iEK, supra note 10, at 96; see also id. at 99, 160. 
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This negativity is jouissance---enjoyment conceived as the negation 
of an object. It is pure appetite, "doubly seconded with will and power."87 
But appetite, "an universal wolf, Must make perforce an universal prey, 
And last eat up himself. "88 Everything, including itself, must be destroyed. 
Negativity itself must be negated. This is the foundational role of diaboli-
cal evil. 
This jouissance is lethal, Zizek writes89-an "insatiate cormorant" that 
soon preys on itself. 90 But, in so doing, the negativity preserves itself.91 As 
much as we would like to, we cannot get rid of the negativity of jouis-
sance.92 
Nevertheless, in the hope of abolishing itself, negativity, in its self-
hatred, can only return to the symbolic order and construct for itself an 
existence in society. That is, it begins to legislate. In its legislation (what 
Hegel calls "positing")93 the thinking thing "is." This existence in the sym-
bolic is the subject's fantasy, built in collaboration with others. The subject 
needs this positive fantasy (and needs others to sustain it with him) because 
it cannot sustain itself on destruction alone. 94 In effect, the cogito mediates 
between the "natural" law of morality and the "positive" law of mere 
legality. 
The preontological law posits a mad, lawless cogito, which in tum 
legislates a positive law; this dialectic makes law very paradoxical. On the 
one hand, law insists that the subject exist as law's negative. On the other 
hand, law condemns the lawless. Thus, law condemns its own child, just as 
revolutions always eat their own children.95 The child of law has its 
revenge, however. It kills its father; Lacan calls this "father enjoyment"-
and replaces him with the "Name-of-the-Father"--culture as we know it. 96 
87. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE HISTORY OF TROILUS AND CRESSIDA act I, SC. iii. 
88. Id. 
89. See ZIZEK, supra note 15, at 239. We must emphasize that Lacan himself recognized many 
different forms of jouissance (enjoyment) and adopted many different paradigms for jouissance over 
his career. Zizek emphasizes only one of these forms of jouissance in the work we discuss. 
90. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II act 2, SC. 1. 
91 . This is, once again, the moment of Aujhebung. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
92. See ZIZEK, supra note 10, at 291-92; ZIZEK, supra note 39, at 53. 
93. HEGEL, supra note 35, at 200-01. 
94. See Zizek, supra note 82, at 90-91. 
95. Renata Salecl writes: 
The paradox of the superego is that, on the one hand, it is linked to the law of castration [i.e., 
the split subject]; but, on the other hand, the superego . .. is analogous to castration in its 
prohibitive function, while at the same time it is not submitted to the phallic order. As a 
result, the superego is a demonic agency that commands the subject to go beyond the phallic 
order and to experience a non-phallic jouissance, but this agency also prohibits the subject 
access to this jouissance. 
Renata Salecl, The Silence of the Feminine Jouissance, in SIC 2, supra note 25, at 175, 189. 
96. Freudians will recognize this as a reference to Freud's myth of the origin of law in the 
primordial murder of the obscene Father Enjoyment. See SIGMUND FREUD, Totem and Taboo, in 13 
THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD (James 
Strachey ed. & trans., 1955). Lacanians will recognize it in the guise of Lacan's rewriting. See Jacques 
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Considered as the constitution of the subject itself, the preontological 
law is the Freudian superego as rewritten by Lacan. In the ordinary Freu-
dian understanding, the "superego" is the internalization of law as prohibi-
tion (sometimes called the incest taboo) roughly equivalent to what is 
commonly called the "conscience"-a "blushing, shame-fac'd spirit that 
mutinies in a man's bosom."97 It chastises the subject for "doing evil." But 
the Lacanian superego has a "diabolical" side as well. This is the side that 
requires the possibility of its own transgression. Consequently, the 
Lacanian superego, as the condition of law, must sadistically cause the 
possibility of the very evil it condemns. 98 
V 
KANTIAN EVIL 
The cogito is deeply implicated in evil-the negation of law. Zizek, 
explicating Kant, identifies four levels of evil.99 Before we explore these 
forms and how they played out in the impeachment episode, perhaps some 
basic information about Kant's moral system will be illuminating. 
The revolutionary aspect of Kantian ethics was the divorce of the 
Moral from the Good. In other words, the moral law has no pregiven sub-
stantive content. Morality is instead to be determined by a purely formal, 
procedural test of universality. This test is the famous categorical impera-
tive. In contrast, good has content. 100 
The formality of the categorical imperative follows from Kant' s the-
ory of human personality as the purely negative capacity for freedom. The 
abstract person is without content; likewise, the moral law freely chosen by 
the abstract person must also be without content. The content of empirical 
personality (that is, our individual characteristics, desires, preferences) is 
not essential to the person, but merely contingent or accidental-
pathological, in Kant's terminology. Any instrumental reason for following 
a law is similarly "pathological"-not moral. This is so no matter how 
conventionally noble these instrumental reasons might be. It is pathologi-
cal, not moral, to feed a starving child out of pity rather than out of duty to 
the moral law. 101 
Lacan, Introduction to the Names-of-the-Father Seminar, in JACQUES LACAN, TELEVISION: A 
CHALLENGE TO THE PSYCHOANALYTIC EsTABLISHMENT 81 (Joan Copjec ed. & Dennis Hollier et al. 
trans., 1990) (1974). Zizek discusses this myth extensively in his works. See, e.g. , ZIZEK, supra note 
10, at 314-18; see also Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, The Subject is Nothing, 5 LAW & 
CRITIQUE 93 (1994) (reviewing ZIZEK, supra note 13). 
97. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD ill act I, SC. 4. 
98. In science fiction terms, this is "the dark side of the force ." 
99. See ZIZEK, supra note 19, at 99-101. 
100. For Kant, the good is what is desirable in relation to our whole state. It is based on reason. 
See KANT, supra note 75, at 450. The good is an object that is desired (and hence a concrete thing 
replete with content). Its existence promises pleasure. See KANT, supra note I, at 76-77, 80. 
101. See ALLISON, supra note I, at 186. 
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For an act to be moral it must be done purely out of a free choice to 
heed the internal voice of the moral law and for no pathological reason. 
Any act not done out of this purest form of duty is evil. 102 
Although the essence of a subject is her abstract will without pathol-
ogy, empirical humans are concrete persons located in a phenomenal 
world. By definition, concrete personality is constituted by pathology. That 
is, to take a concrete action is precisely to pour a content into the empty 
form of the moral law. Unhappily, this means that every concrete choice is 
inescapably pathological; the act always has an instrumental reason. Con-
sequently, Kant insists that every attempt by man to act ethically and to 
obey the moral law is stained by the "evil" of pathological motives. 
Of Zizek' s four evils, the first three correspond to the three types of 
ordinary human or "radical" evil, which Kant identifies as weakness, wick-
edness, and impurity.1°3 Each of these three empirical evils involves not 
only a surrender to inclination, but also a failure to confront the truth of the 
event after the fact. The fourth type of evil, however, is not empirical but 
transcendental. It corresponds to the Kantian category of "diabolical evil." 
A. Radical Evil as Frailty (Lack of Willpower) 
The first type of evil is simply weakness of the will. 104 In this most 
banal of evils, a person claims either to be too ignorant to know his duty, 
or simply unable to resist his inclination to act. ("The devil made me do 
it.") 
Traditional Christian ethics, following Plato, interpreted frailty as a 
negative quality (that is, lack of goodness conceived as a positive quality). 
For Kant, however, such a "negative" concept does not suffice. For exam-
ple, by this test we would have to say that a dog is evil. On account of its 
lack of cognitive power, the dog is too ignorant to understand the moral 
law, and on account of its voracious nature and lack of self-consciousness, 
it is incapable of molding its behavior in accordance with the moral law. 
But this is meaningless. Even though a dog may not be moral, we excul-
pate a dog precisely because its ignorance and voraciousness mean that it 
102. See KANT, supra note 19, at 49, 55-56. Kant also claimed that all human beings had an evil 
disposition, within his definition. See id. at 46. This is why he called human evil "radical" evil. Kant 
himself did not offer a logical proof for this proposition because he stated it was self-evident. See id. at 
56-57. Kantian scholars disagree about whether his claim that all human beings arc radically evil is 
necessarily true. Compare ALLISON, supra note 1, with Mark Timmons, Evil and Imputation in Kant 's 
Ethics, 2 ANN. REv. L. & ETHICS 113 (1994). 
103. Following Ziuk, in this section we list impurity as the third, most extreme form of radical 
evil. Kant, however, made impurity the intermediate form of radical evil. As should become apparent 
by the end of this Review Essay, we ultimately agree with Kant' s assessment that wickedness is the 
most dangerous form of radical evil. In fact, the hypocrisy of impurity might be all that we can expect 
from the law. 
104. See KANT, supra note 19, at 53; Timmons, supra note 102, at 123-27. 
2000] DIABOLICAL EVIL 673 
could not have acted otherwise. •os The concept of culpability requires a 
capacity to be moral. 
Consequently, following Kant, Zifok argues that the devil (that is, 
pathological inclination) never makes man do anything. Given that human 
nature is nothing but the capacity for choice, when man falls, he always 
freely chooses to disobey the moral law, and to give in to his frailties and 
inclinations.106 Every choice, no matter how coerced or "forced," is never-
theless a choice imposing moral responsibility. Furthermore, the claim that 
one couldn't help oneself is not merely false, it is a lie that compounds the 
evil of the act; this claim is an immoral response to the fact of one's own 
evil.107 
B. Radical Evil as Wickedness (Prosecutorial Zeal) 
Zifok's second form of evil corresponds to Kant's "wickedness." The 
way in which the wicked subject denies his own responsibility is precisely 
the reverse of the device favored by the morally weak subject. The morally 
weak subject admits his transgression but refuses to accept responsibility 
on the false grounds that he is weak. The wicked subject falsely claims 
conformity to moral law when, in fact, he violated the moral law by 
choosing to act to further his own pathological jouissance. The wicked 
subject does this by refusing to hear the moral law as an internal voice that 
calls from within each abstract person. The subject instead externalizes 
moral law by identifying it with a specific regime of positive law. That is, 
the subject pretends that the moral voice calls from the outside, not the 
inside. By claiming to follow externalized "standards," the subject not only 
chooses to disobey his duty to hear the internal voice of moral law, he dis-
guises the nature of his actual choice-the exaltation of pathology over 
morality. In Kant's words: 
[T]he depravity . .. or, if one prefers, the corruption ... of the 
human heart is the propensity of the power of choice to maxims 
that subordinate the incentives of the moral law to others (not 
moral ones). It can also be called the perversity .. . of the human 
heart, for it reverses the ethical order as regards the incentives of a 
free power of choice . ... 108 
105. Here we confess we neither know nor aspire to know anything about dogs. Yet, on reflection, 
dog owners are constantly explaining to their pets that they are "bad." We read this custom, however 
tentatively, as anthropomorphism. 
106. See Ziiek, supra note 51 , at 246, 261; ZllEK, supra note 32, at 169. 
107. So, it would seem that immoral behavior characteristic of the morally weak agent can be 
explained in terms of the agent's reasons for action: She does have reasons for acting as she does-
considerations bearing on action whose relevance depends on inclination-which she intentionally 
takes to be a reason for action .. . and which thus provides a rationalizing explanation of her actions. 
Her action (or omission) is thus imputable. See Timmons, supra note 102, at 125. 
108. KANT, supra note 19, at 54. 
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In other words, unlike the weak subject who feels guilty and searches for 
an excuse, the wicked subject feels smug and self-righteous because she 
acts out of principle-what Henry Allison calls "ungrounded moral 
self-satisfaction."109 To put this another way, the subject chooses to follow 
his jouissance and then looks for an external regime that coincides with his 
jouissance as a cover story, a retroactive rationalization for his actions. 
A wicked subject may frequently act in a manner that is outwardly 
consistent with moral law. The appearance, however, is deceptive. The 
wicked subject is not motivated by the moral law, but by a nonmoral 
maxim.110 Consequently, the act is wicked. 
From this position, the prosecutor sees himself as enforcing the exter-
nal law to the limit, not for pathological reasons but because he was simply 
the neutral instrument of the law. This was, ultimately, the position of the 
Republicans. Their enjoyment of the process was palpable, but they sought 
to place responsibility, not in their enjoyment, but in the requirements of 
the criminal law and the United States Constitution. 
One should not infer from this that we are accusing the Republicans 
of hypocrisy; we have already acquitted them of this charge. In our defini-
tion, hypocrisy requires that the hypocrite consciously seeks to deceive 
others. In contrast, wickedness consists of self-deception. 111 Consequently, 
the "radically evil" aspect of prosecutorial zeal lies precisely in the sincer-
ity which masks the subject's failure to confront his own pathology. This is 
a violation of the Kantian principles of both autonomy and reflection. 112 
Wickedness can have horrific empirical consequences which indeed 
approach the sublime of diabolical evil (the fourth "transcendental" form 
of evil we will discuss). By externalizing morality the prosecutor is only 
able to judge himself as moral per se insofar as he enforces the external 
law to the full extent. The prosecutor can then indulge his jouissance 
through the sadistic pursuit of the external evil doer, while maintaining the 
public position that he is merely doing his duty. On this reasoning, what-
ever the prosecutor does is always justified because the prosecuted, being 
evil, always deserves what he gets. The impeachment hearings were a mild 
case, compared to the atrocities of the French Terror, the Nazi death 
camps, the Stalinist show trials, the Maoist Cultural Revolution, and Pol 
Pot's year zero campaign. In these instances when society organizes itself 
around prosecution, the government in effect makes an obscene unspoken 
pact with its people: So long as you pledge your allegiance to me, you 
may indulge your jouissance in any way you want, no matter how horrible. 
109. ALLISON, supra note l , at 158. In Timmons' s words, "[S]he has in effect deliberately adopted 
a supreme maxim that gives priority to non-moral reasons." Timmons, supra note 102, at 130. 
110. See Timmons, supra note 102, at 130. 
111. See id. 
112. See id. at 131. 
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The totalitarian master says, "you are allowed to kill, rape and plunder the 
Enemy, let yourself go and excessively enjoy, violate ordinary moral 
prohibitions .. . in so far as you follow Me." 113 
The enunciated position of wickedness cannot be sustained, however. 
Kantian moral law-the categorical imperative-is form only. The ascrip-
tion of any content to moral duty must be prompted by pathology. Hence, 
as Zizek emphasizes, duty cannot serve as an excuse for doing our duty. 114 
Kant considered the wicked subject to have a perverted mind, 115 and 
Zizek agrees. The position of the wicked, Zizek explains, is the fundamen-
tal position of the sexual pervert in the technical Lacanian sense of the 
term. The position of the pervert is to become the object of the other's 
jouissance. As Zizek puts it: 
The obscene jouissance of this situation is generated by the 
fact that I conceive of myself as exculpated from what I am 
doing: isn't it nice to be able to inflict pain on others in the full 
awareness that I'm not responsible for it, that I am merely fulfilling 
the Other's Will . . . this is what Kantian ethics prohibits. 116 
Kant was thus no pervert, 117 even if Lacan placed him with his notorious 
contemporary, the Marquis de Sade. 118 The Republicans, however, were. 
Ironically, while the House Managers accused Clinton of sexual obsession, 
they themselves adopted the psychoanalytic position of sexual perversion. 
They objectified themselves and served the jouissance of their followers, 
by performing their supposedly nonpathological duty. 119 
C. Radical Evil as Impurity (Legalism) 
The third type of evil Zizek identifies-legalism, or impurity-
provides a somewhat more subtle attempt at avoiding responsibility for 
radical evil by externalizing morality as an identifiable set of rules or posi-
tive law. If the prosecutor hides his jouissance by following the law to the 
fullest extent, the legalist identifies morality with the bare minimum 
required by law. The legalist feels that he is free to choose jouissance to 
113. ZIZEK, supra note 10, at 391. 
114. See ZIZEK, supra note 15, at 80, 220-21. 
115. See supra text accompanying note 108. 
116. ZIZEK, supra note 15, at 222-23. As Jacques-Alain Miller explains: 
It is commonly thought that the pervert uses other people, other peoples' bodies, without due 
respect for their status as subjects. Lacan' s fundamental clinical thesis regarding perversion is 
the opposite. Lacan asserts that the pervert devotes himself to the Other's jouissance, the 
Other' s sexual enjoyment, trying to restore lost sexual enjoyment to the Other. 
Miller, supra note 19, at 213. 
117. See ZIZEK, supra note 32, at 170. 
118. See infra text accompanying notes 123-29. 
119. This is the import of the Lacanian slogan of Kant avec Sade. The agency that pronounces the 
ethical imperative is "a sublime version of the sadistic torturer who demands the impossible and finds 
enjoyment in humiliating the subject." Id. at 173. 
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the fullest extent, just so long as he is seen to follow the few rules. In con-
trast to the prosecutor who doesn't modify his behavior in accordance with 
moral law, but searches for a positive law that will justify his jouissance, 
the impure, legalist subject does modify his behavior in accordance with 
preexisting law, but only insofar as it also serves his pathological reasons. 
If he has an incentive to act otherwise, the impure subject bends the law 
whenever he thinks he can get away with it. 
Unlike the wicked subject who does not recognize the moral law but 
adopts alternate immoral maxims, the impure person does recognize the 
moral law, and may even desire to follow it, 120 but acts for other, patho-
logical, purposes. 
[T]he impurity ... of the human heart consists in this, that 
although the maxim is good with respect to its object (the intended 
compliance with the law) and perhaps even powerful enough in 
practice, it is not purely moral, i.e., it has not, as it should be [the 
case], adopted the law alone as its sufficient incentive but, on the 
contrary, often (and perhaps always) needs still other incentives 
besides it ... in other words, actions conforming to duty are not 
done purely from duty. 121 
When conduct is based not upon the rules as such, but only on fear and 
approbation of the incentives created by law, the subject's motivation is 
bad, even if the action is "legal." 122 Action that accords with positive law 
for the instrumental purpose of avoiding an unwanted result is based on 
instrumental reasoning and is just as pathological as any action taken in 
order to achieve jouissance. At least the wicked subject deludes himself 
into thinking that he cares for nothing but morality. The wicked subject can 
claim a sort of tragic nobility. He will stick to his principles to his own det-
riment as we saw in the impeachment drama. 
In contrast, the impure subject who knows only instrumental reason 
reveals a fundamental indifference to morality in every act he undertakes. 
Although he hears the voice of the moral law itself, and may even believe 
that he should obey the moral law, he needs incentives in order to act. If 
the impure subject eventually goes down, it is not because of delusion (as 
is the case of the wicked) but because of miscalculation. The impure sub-
ject is corrupt but has no guilty conscience because she can always ration-
alize her bad motives by the fact of outward compliance with the law. This 
was precisely the Republican accusation against Clinton. 
Prosecutorial zeal (wickedness) and legalism (impurity) are two pre-
cisely opposing results of externalizing morality as positive law. Not 
120. See ALLISON, supra note 1, at 160 ("It is clear that in spite of the need for an extrarnoral 
incentive, such impurity is compatible with a considerable degree of moral commitment."). 
121. KANT, supra note 19, at 53-54. 
122. Timmons, supra note 102, at 127. 
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surprisingly, therefore, the prosecutor and the legalist each sees the other 
as the very paragon of evil. This is because each position threatens to 
reveal the fundamental evil nature of the other. If morality is the external 
law, as the wicked Republicans insist, the impure Democrats ask: Why 
isn't it sufficient to follow the letter of the law? To do more is to admit 
a moral law beyond positive law, and from this admission against interest, 
the impure could impeach the wicked prosecutor for immorality-failure 
to consult the moral law. If morality is mere compliance with the law 
without regard to motive, as the impure Democrats believe, the wicked 
Republicans ask: What's wrong with prosecuting the law to its fullest 
extent? Even if your legalisms get you off the hook this time, there are 
probably worse things you've done that we have not yet discovered-
hence all-out prosecution is justified. The wicked subject sees with X-ray 
vision the venal and corrupt heart of the impure subject. Likewise, the 
impure subject correctly sees that the wicked subject is not following 
morality, but jouissance. Consequently, it is precisely the claims of 
Clinton's supporters that his infractions were minor peccadillos that infuri-
ated the prosecutors, and precisely the prosecutors' claims to righteousness 
that disgusted Clinton's supporters. Each side saw the image of its own 
radical evil reflected back at him in the words and deeds of the other. 
D. Diabolical Evil 
The fourth evil ascends from the darkling plain of the phenomenal to 
something more sublime. This is the transcendental realm of diabolical 
evil. A subject is merely radically evil insofar as pathology influences his 
choice. A subject is diabolically evil if she would freely choose to violate 
the moral law for nonpathological reasons. At the sublime level of 
"diabolical" evil, a person must know that the stain of pathology is absent. 
Evil is done for the sake of duty alone. It is beyond the pleasure princi-
ple.123 
Recall that the moral is that which is done for nonpathological rea-
sons. Now we have evil done for nonpathological reasons. At this lofty 
height, evil is indistinguishable from morality. 
Lacan insisted that in order to understand Kantian ethics, it is neces-
sary to read Kant avec Sade. 124 If one does so, one can see that at the level 
123. See ZliEK, Lcx>KING AWRY, supra note 7, at 162. 
124. Lacan first introduced this shocking comparison in his seventh seminar on the ethics of 
psychoanalysis. See JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN, BOOK Vll: THE ETHICS OF 
PsYCHOANALYSIS 1959-1960 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed. & Dennis Porter trans. , W .W . Norton & Co. 
1992) and later developed it in the essay Kant avec Sade, translated into English as Kant with Sade, 51 
OCTOBER 55 (James B. Swenson, Jr. trans., 1989). Note, the name of this essay is not "Kant is Sade" or 
"Kant as Sade." Lacan is a very subtle reader of philosophy and a great admirer of Kant who would 
never purport to reduce the brilliant ethical theories of the philosopher from Koenigsberg to the truly 
mediocre ravings of the notorious marquis. See Miller, supra note 19, at 212-13. Rather his point is that 
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of the sublime, evil and morality are indistinguishable. What shocks us 
about Sade is the content of his principles. But according to Kant, morality 
is indifferent to content and is to be decided by formal criteria. 125 Conse-
quently, Lacan shows that an unimaginably nightmarish regime of univer-
sal reciprocal torture such as that proposed by Sade would be in perfect 
accord with the categorical imperative, and, therefore, perfectly ethical. 126 
The diabolical subject may initially seem similar to the wicked subject 
as they both act out of principle and they both violate the moral law. But 
this resemblance is only skin deep. The wicked subject is deluded. She 
incorrectly identifies the moral law and follows an incorrect maxim 
grounded in pathology .. As the wicked subject's motivations are indifferent 
to the true moral law, her actions may or may not coincidentally comport 
with the moral law .127 In contrast, the diabolical subject, like the angelic 
subject, has perfect knowledge of the moral law but nonpathologically 
adopts the violation of the moral law as a maxim. Consequently, she sys-
tematically always violates (and hence accords with) the moral law. 
if one takes Kant's theory of morality and diabolical evil seriously, and reads him alongside Sade, one 
will find a perfect structural parallelism. As we shall discuss, however, in order to do this, Lacan had to 
rewrite and improve Sade in order to make an idealized, internally coherent sadistic theory. The actual 
Sade could not live up to the comparison Lacan offered. 
125. Sade himself did not expressly make the Kantian argument. Indeed, Sade probably never 
heard of Kant, whose Critique of Pure Reason was written only eight years prior to The Philosophy of 
Bedroom. Nevertheless, Sade tried to justify his position by reference to the new philosophy of 
liberalism of which Kant was, of course, one of the creators. Miller presents Lacan as a lawyer making 
Sade's argument for him. Lacan says, in effect, 
I'm going to demonstrate that Sade's principle is perfectly valid and that it's as beautiful and 
moral as Kant's. On what grounds do you object to Sade's principle? You object that Mr. 
Sade alone endorses it. But as a matter of fact, if we consider only the form of what he's 
saying, it is undoubtedly a universal principle. 
Miller, supra note 19, at 232. The retort that "[t]he consequences," that is, the content, "are horrible" is 
inept and indicates a failure to understand Kant because "at the level of a fundamental law, 
pathological consequences must not be taken into account." Id. 
126. See ZIZEK, supra note 13, at 234. In Lacan's words, Kant's standard is that: 
For this maxim to become law, it is necessary and it is sufficient that, when tested by such a 
reason, it can be retained as universal by right of Logic. Let us recall that this does not mean 
that this right imposes itself upon everyone, but that it is valid for all cases, or better, that it is 
not valid in any case . .. if it is not valid in every case .... 
Lacan, Kant with Sade, supra note 124, at 57. Lacan describes Sade's universal maxim as, "I have the 
right of enjoyment over ... your body, anyone can say to me, and I will exercise this right, without any 
limit stopping me in the capriciousness of the exactions that I might have the taste to satiate." Id. at 58. 
That is, every person has a duty to submit to torture by any other human being ( or at least has no right 
to be protected from this torture). Sade tried to justify this regime as necessitated by the French 
Revolution's denial of traditional property rights. If I cannot claim a property right in my ancestral 
home, how can I claim a right that my body also not be violated? As Miller has pointed out, the very 
awkwardness of this formulation looks forward to Lacan's ultimate conclusion that Sade was unable in 
fact to develop a regime that would meet the categorical imperative. See Miller, supra note 19, at 231. 
127. As Kant notes, if a subject acts upon a maxim other than the moral law, even if the subject 
does, in fact, take an act that complies with the law, "it is purely accidental that these actions agree with 
the law, for the incentives might equally well incite its violation." KANT, supra note 19, at 54. 
2000] . DIABOUCAL EVIL 679 
This fourth level, diabolical evil, is the level at which the cogito oper-
ates. Law requires the cogito in its negativity to come forth. The cogito 
(that is, the unconscious) is pure crime. It does what it does without any 
support from the symbolic order, and it does this out of necessity, accord-
ing to law's own injunction. Its domain is "beyond the good."128 What it 
produces, however, is nonpathological and is therefore, in Kantian logic, a 
priori moral. 
As Jacques-Alain Miller explains Lacan's analysis of Kant avec 
Sade: "The way Lacan looks at Kant's fundamental law is not dissimilar 
to the way he looks at Descartes' cogito." 129 Kant's ethical law of univer-
sality, with no pathological distinctions, is the wiping out of the world that 
leaves nothing behind but intellect-pure "I think." 
[F]irst you have the mind with imagination, memory, 
perception, mathematics, etc. Descartes erases all that, and the void 
which is left he calls the "cogito" -that is, the pure fact of 
thinking, which remains undeniable, something which cannot 
disappear. In Kant's work, this void is void of all that is 
pathological in the subject .... 130 
Moreover, "in Kant's work, at the very moment all objects disappear at the 
level of the law, the [ex-timate] voice [of morality] remains, and the 
fact that, in Descartes' work, when all the contents of self-consciousness 
disappear, something is left as a remainder, which is 'cogito ergo sum."'131 
Consequently, the Kantian ethic as cogito has the potential for absolute 
violence, or diabolical evil. "Kant's ethics is thus a kind of Terror-radical 
and destructive-because in it the world disappears .... " 132 
Morality, diabolical evil, and the cogito all equate with the death 
drive. "Drive," as such, attempts to escape this circle of guilt generated by 
the superego by forswearing desire and its goal of achieving jouissance in 
an object of desire. Rather than seeking to acquire this impossible object, 
as we do in desire, 133 in drive, we seek everyday pleasure in mindless, 
repetitive activity. In Lacan's terms, although desire has both an aim and a 
goal (that is, to achieve the object of desire), drive has an aim but no 
128. ZIZEK, supra note 10, at 161. 
129. Miller, supra note 19, at 226. 
130. Id. at 226. 
131. Id. at 230. 
132. Id. at 226. 
133. Desire constitutes the feeling that we are incomplete (castration), but some object would cure 
the wound if only we could attain it. If only I could obtain the right girlfriend, varsity letter, or 
prestigious faculty position, everything would be fine. See Schroeder, supra note 23, at 506. These are 
fantasies that Lacan called l'objet petit a. The "a" stands for autre, or "other." L'objet petit a "names 
the void of that unattainable surplus that sets our desire in motion." ZIZEK, LooKJNG AWRY, supra note 
7, at 134. 
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goal-the subject attempts to keep the object of desire at a distance and 
seeks satisfaction by impotently circling around it. 134 According to Zizek: 
Desire and drive are clearly opposed with respect to the way 
they relate to jouissance . ... Desire stands for the economy in 
which whatever object we get hold of is 'never it', the 'Real 
Thing', that which the subject is forever trying to attain but which 
eludes him again and again, while drive stands for the opposite 
economy, within which the stain of jouissance always accompanies 
our acts. 135 
Drive reflects diabolical evil, or the cogito, because it is the remainder 
after absolutely purging human activity of all desire. Having renounced 
desire, a subject would have absolutely no content. In effect, drive annihi-
lates the world for the subject. 
Kant thought diabolical evil to be impossible. No act is possible 
unless our passion drove us to it. As we have discussed, every act by the 
subject as a concrete person living in the phenomenal world is inevitably 
stained by pathology. 136 Although everyone experiences a moment of the 
cogito and occasionally we give in to our drives, only psychotic subjects 
remain totally locked within and are controlled by their death drive. 137 
Hence, diabolical evil is impossible in that it cannot be maintained in the 
phenomenological world. Despite his pretensions, the historic Sade was 
not diabolic, but wicked-literally the textbook example of a pervert. The 
very assertion that either the devil, or morality, or the law, made us act is 
always mere radical evil. 138 
VI 
SUBLIMATION 
Man cannot sustain diabolical evil. Rather, diabolical evil as such 
is the province of God. Only God is assured that whatever is done is uni-
versal in its quality and nonpathological. 139 Human beings are, as Kant 
134. See Marie-Hel~ne Brousse, The Drive (II), in READING SEMINAR XI, supra note 63, 109, 112; 
Antonio Quinet, The Gaze as an Object, in READING SEMINAR XI, supra note 63, 139, 140-41; 
Schroeder, supra note 58. 
135. ZliEK, supra note 10, at 291. 
136. See supra text accompanying notes 100-03. 
137. Berthold-Bond, however, emphasizes that no psychotic is purely so. See BERTHOLD-BOND, 
supra note 28, at 202. Thus, a psychotic (like a healthy subject) has two centers-one of which is in 
touch with "rcality"-that is, the symbolic order. This rational center makes "cure" of psychosis a 
possibility. One must address the rational side of the psychotic and coax it back to strength. 
138. See filEK, supra note 15, at 239. 
139. See id. at 237 (equating God with diabolical evil). 
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recognized, "split subjects." They act, but they are never sure whether uni-
versal reason or mere inclination caused what they did. 140 
This constant state of uncertainty as to one's own motives constitutes 
ethics. Ethics can only be practiced by beings who are finite.141 God is not 
ethical precisely because God is quite sure what caused God to act. Only 
finite human beings make "ethical" decisions--decisions caused for mixed 
motives of reason and pathology. Human beings in their ethical mode are 
thus said to be in a constant state of becoming. 142 God already is. 
Zizek thus implies that the very function of civil legislation is to 
relieve people of the unbearable pressure of the moral law, which leads 
logically to diabolical evil: 
Social regulations make peaceful coexistence possible, while 
moral law is a traumatic injunction that disrupts it. One is thus 
tempted to go a step further and invert once more the relationship 
between 'external' social norms and the inner moral law: what if 
the subject invents external social norms precisely in order to 
escape the unbearable pressure of the moral law? Isn't it much 
easier to have an external Master who can be duped, towards whom 
one can maintain a minimal distance and private space, than an 
ex-timate Master, a stranger, a foreign body in the very heart of 
one's being?143 
Power, Zizek suggests, is force from the outside, opposing inclination. It 
relies on the externalization of the ex-timate Law. Thus, as opposed to the 
quasi-paranoid Foucauldian attitude toward power as sinister and alien, 
power is a positive relief from the unbearable pressure of moral law. 144 
Hence, the whole point of the symbolic order is to paper over the evil 
that men do in hope that, at least outwardly, the appearance of lawfulness 
might be maintained. Social legislation allows people to behave "legally." 
The introduction of legality allows persons to have pathological motives 
and to keep a distance from the evil Thing that is the cogito. 145 
"Oepidalization, the establishment of the rule of paternal law, is precisely 
the process of gentrifying monstrous otherness, transforming it into a 
partner within the horizon of discursive communication."146 In other words, 
hypocrisy might be the price we must necessarily pay for civilization. 
140. See Zu:EK, supra note 10, at 365 ("[W]e never know if the determinate content that accounts 
for the specificity of our acts is the right one: that is, if we have really acted in accordance with the law 
and have not been guided by some hidden pathological motives"). 
141. See ZilEK, supra note 15, at 80, 219; Zu:EK, supra note IO, 25. 
142. See KANT, supra note 19, at 68. 
143. ZilEK, supra note IO, at 280. 
144. See KANT, supra note 19, at 68. 
145. See Zu:EK, supra note 15, at 237. For this reason,Zikk insists that Kant has his Aristotelian 
side-an emphasis on proper measure. Id. 237-38. 
146. Zu:EK, supra note IO, at 53. 
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A legal regime can never be anything but positive law (that is, mere 
legality). By positing this proposition, we are not simply arguing that the 
"impure" position towards the law is the best that fallen man can achieve. 
The lesson we should draw from Kant is precisely that both the impure and 
the wicked are wrong about law. Not only must morality be distinguished 
from law, but the purpose of positive law must be to protect us from the 
cogito of morality at its most sublime. Both the impure and the wicked are 
evil precisely because they try to externalize morality by conflating it with 
law. By doing so, they both expect more of law than law can deliver-that 
is, they want law to deliver them from their moral duty. As a result, the 
impure demean law by failing to give it the respect it deserves, while the 
wicked disgrace law by raising it to a exalted position it cannot fill. 
Instead, we must recognize law not as the abstraction of universal Law, but 
as a contingent collection of concrete, positive laws-imperfect tools of 
social organization and control that can be dangerous if wielded carelessly. 
We must remember that morality is not external, but ex-timate. It is pre-
cisely the job of the modem state to erect and maintain the wall separating 
law from morality. Each person must find the call of the moral law from 
within her own heart, not the law library. 
And now we reach why the public was horrified by impeachment. 
Zizek's most recent work was written at the very early stages of the 
Monicagate scandal. He (unsuccessfully) tries to use the example of 
Clinton's fibs about the true nature of L'affaire Lewinsky as an illustration 
of a favorite point of his: The symbolic order is a fiction that nevertheless 
functions. Thus, so long as Clinton's true behavior remained concealed 
from the gaze of the big Other, political support of Clinton was possible. 
At stake in this example is repression of the traumatic and the insistence 
upon the smooth functioning of the symbolic order. 147 
Subsequent events made it perfectly apparent that the public sup-
ported Clinton even after his behavior was displayed to the gaze of the big 
Other in pornographic detail (courtesy of Kenneth Starr's X-rated report). 
Hence, Zizek' s specific analysis of the Clinton prosecution was incorrect. 
Support for Clinton did not evaporate but was enhanced by Republican 
exposure of impurity. 
We draw a different explanation based from Zizek's theory. Although 
we argue that the Republicans were in the end only radically evil-
wickedly responding to the radical evil of Clinton's impurity-the public 
thought it could hear in Republican rhetoric the echo of sublime destruc-
tion-a mad, psychotic morality that would destroy everything in its path. 
"What if the Republicans were speaking the truth?" we asked ourselves. 
"What if they really were the pure tools of the moral law?" Then we would 
be facing the ontologization of diabolical evil. Zizek emphasizes that the 
147. See id. at 329. 
2000] D/ABOUCAL EVIL 683 
ethical act, when approached too closely, turns into diabolical evil. 148 We 
suggest that the sublime monstrosity of diabolical evil is what the Ameri-
can public feared. Ontologizations of diabolical evil are the hack marks 
upon the slaughterbench of history-the appalling evidence of what per-
haps we truly are. Why do we react with horror upon contemplating the 
Holocaust, the Pol Pot regime, or ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia, 
being as how they happened so far away in time and space? Precisely 
because we secretly fear that what drives such events is a universal princi-
ple of insanity-diabolical evil-in which we ourselves share. This fear 
that "in our hearts we know they're right"149 was precisely why the Repub-
licans fell so drastically in the polls. 150 
148. See id. at 25; ZIZEK, supra note 15, at 230. 
149. ZIZEK, SUBLIME OBJECT,supra note 25, at 5 (''The greatest mass murders and holocausts 
have always been perpetrated in the name of man as harmonious being without antagonistic tension"). 
For an essay praising impeachment and urging the "necessity for periodic disinfection of the corners of 
society," see John. 0. McGinnis, Impeachment Offenses, POLICY 29, 33 (June-July 1999). 
150. Of course, they have bounced back! They have convinced the public, per Kant's theory, that 
they are merely wicked, not diabolical. 
